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♣ This paper is, essentially, a ‘series’ of reflections on comments by distinguished economists, who also happen 
to be personal friends and, more importantly, friends of ASSRU, on Taming the Incomputable, Reconstructing 
the Nonconstructive and Deciding the Undecidable in Mathematical Economics (forthcoming in New 
Mathematics and Natural Computation, 2011). Abstract
Non-standard analysis can be harnessed by the recursion theorist. But as a
computable economist, the conundrums of the L￿wenheim-Skolem theorem and
the associated Skolem paradox, seem to pose insurmountable epistemological
di¢ culties against the use of algorithmic non-standard analysis. Discontinuities
can be tamed by recursive analysis. This particular kind of taming may be a way
out of the formidable obstacles created by the di¢ culties of Diophantine Decision
Problems. Methods of existence proofs, used by the ￿ classical￿mathematician ￿
even if not invoking the axiom of choice ￿cannot be shown to be equivalent to
the exhibition of an instance in the sense of a constructive proof. These issues
were prompted by the fertile and critical contributions to this special issue.
21 Preliminaries
"We have, therefore, a situation in which essentially discrete phe-
nomena are modelled by continuous functions which must then be
discretized for calculational purposes.
Would it not make more sense to treat the discrete problem dis-
cretely in the ￿rst place?
[20], p.216
In [31], I concentrated on trying to understand a fragment of orthodox math-
ematical economics from the point of view of (classical) computability theory,
constructive analysis1 and (algorithmic) undecidability. It was inevitable that
there were the twin horns of a dilemma that I was not able to resolve: on the
one hand, to be fair and representative with the kind of mathematics I could
￿and should - have invoked, from the points of view of one or the other of the
three algorithmic foundations for computability theory, constructive analysis
and undecidability; on the other hand, to avoid being too idiosyncratic about
the chosen ￿ fragment￿of mathematical economics.
Moreover, I left aside, for other exercises more detailed treatment of the
impact of developments in computational,. algorithmic and stochastic complex-
ity theories on economic theorizing and applied economics, particularly in their
policy contexts. This was partly due to the fact that I was working, almost si-
multaneously, and in parallel, on a fairly comprehensive study of computational
complexity theory ￿with subsidiary considerations of algorithmic and stochas-
tic complexity theories ￿from the point of view of a computable economist (see
[32]).
These are two serious lacunae that cannot be resolved adequately within the
scope and natural limits of a Journal article, despite the fact that the Editors
of New Mathematics and Natural Computation have been over-generous
in the space they have granted me.
However, the six distinguished scholars2, who have taken the time, and made
the e⁄ort, to try to understand the vision of a computable economist, sympa-
thetically and generously, have contributed entirely original visions of their own,
quite independently of a strict interpretation of [31] alone. Rosser￿ s detailed and
thought-provoking interpretation is also a valuable work on understanding one
aspect of the methodology of Barkley Rosser, Snr., to whose Centennial Mem-
ory [31] was originally dedicated. Duncan Foley￿ s ingenious emphasis on the
relevance and importance of approximation theory is characteristically lucid.
Stephen Kinsella￿ s own development of an algorithmic economics - its necessity
and desirability - seems to have its starting point in the kind of work in [31],
1I did not try to be precise about the kind of constructive analysis I was adhering to, or
invoking. Today I would be more speci￿c and base myself more ￿ dogmatically￿on Brouwerian
constructivism, with its underpinning in Intuitionism.
2Francisco Doria￿ s contribution to this Special Issue is an entirely independent contribution
and has, ostensibly, nothing to do with the contents of [31]. However, Doria is very familiar
with my work - and I with some of his - and I am sure there is some deep connection and
meaning, for and with computable economics, in his fascinating contribution.
3and my earlier and contemporary writings and thoughts. Stefano Zambelli￿ s
comprehensive survey of computable economics ￿its origins, its developments,
the vicissitudes it underwent in the form of almost ￿ still births￿and numerous
teething problems ￿could only have been given by one who was at least a fellow
pioneer in the adventure and excitement of the genesis of a wholly new research
program. Cassey Lee has emphasized methodological aspects that can be culled
out of [31] and, in general, in my many earlier writings, and contemporary work.
Sundar Sarukkai brings the fresh and challenging perspective of a Philosopher of
Mathematics, with serious and deep underpinnings and understanding of mod-
ern theoretical physics and its methodologies to an interpretation of my paper.
It is completely unnecessary for me to try to summarize or re-interpret in-
terpretations; there is no end to such exercises. Moreover, each of the above
contributions are concisely clear and need no secondary interpretations. It will
also be slightly unfair of me to try to comment or correct any particular inter-
pretation, whether I agree with it or not, since the distinguished contributors
are not themselves going to respond further to my possible comments.
I welcome, therefore, the informed contributions by sympathetically critical
friends, whose insights and questions allow me to clarify three issues, hopefully
to dispel careless and uninformed remarks and prejudices by those intrinsically
hostile to any questioning of the dominance of real analysis in mathematical
economics. The three issues are: the place of non-standard analysis in mathe-
matical economics in the algorithmic mode; the computability of discontinuous
processes; and the role of proof in the theology that has become mathematical
economics, following blindly a misunderstood classical mathematical analysis.
There is one minor point in Sundar Sarukkai￿ s major and most interesting
contribution which I might be allowed to clarify. Professor Sarukkai suggests
that ￿ the central argument [in Velupillai￿ s paper]￿is ￿ how mathematics is used
in physics should be a model for how it can be used in economics.￿ I am
afraid my examples of the Dirac delta function and the Feynman integral, and
the way I may have incorporated the saga of their emergence and place in
mathematical physics, surely, had the ￿ avour of an ￿ evangelist￿! It is entirely
understandable, therefore, that Professor Sarukkai was misled into thinking that
my focus was on ￿ how mathematics is used in physics should be a model for how
it can be used in economics.￿ Nothing could be further from my aims3. The
felicitous examples of the saga of the Dirac delta function and the Feynman
integral were harnessed to make the case against moulding a theory to ￿t a
prior mathematics ￿the common practice in orthodox mathematical economics.
Beauty of the mathematical formalization of a theory ￿as in the case of Dirac
￿and the minimum functionality of mathematical operators for a physically
relevant mathematical physics ￿as in the case of Feynman ￿have never been
the motive force for the mathematization of economic theory (with notable and
rare exceptions).
3More recently, during a happy meeting at a Workshop in Trento I was able to clarify my
stance to Sundar Sarukkai. But his contribution is of independent interest, quite separate
from structuring his ingenious vision around my ￿ctitious vision. There are many advantages
in structuring interesting visions around imaginary cores.
4At a recent Trento two-day Workshop on Experimental Economics, organised
by the Computable4 and Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL), I gave a
talk on The Algorithmic Revolution in the Social Sciences ([33]). At the end of
my talk one of my senior colleagues wondered whether I was a Bayesian; when
I replied I preferred to be agnostic about it, at least pro tempore, he informed
(not suggested; not questioned) me that I would be forced to admit ￿ continuity￿
if I did don a Bayesian hat in any of my statistical work. This may have been
a piece of information he felt obliged to give me in view of the important part
played by Stochastic Complexity Theory in my vision of the Algorithmic Social
Sciences and in turn, the role played by Bayesian theory in it.
This kind of uninformed inference, every time one mentions algorithmic
methods and their mathematical underpinnings in recursion theory and con-
structive mathematics, is very common, despite the existence (sic!) of com-
putable or recursive analysis and constructive analysis ￿at least since the birth
of recursion theory over 70 years ago and Brouwerian constructivism almost a
century ago. The inference is that algorithmic methods are about the discrete
and digital. Analysis, characterised by limit and approximation processes, is
supposed to be alien to algorithmic methods, to the digital computer and to a
mathematical economics based on recursion theory of constructive mathemat-
ics5.
2 Non-Standard Analysis and Computability
"The very ￿rst model of nonstandard analysis, due to Schmieden
and Laugwitz ([22]), was in fact completely constructive. ... We
emphasise that the development [in this paper] is done in compliance
with Bishop￿ s strict constructivism ([2]), and that it may indeed be
formalised within Martin-L￿f￿ s type theory [see, for example, [14]],
which will be the o¢ cial metatheory in case of doubt. Thus it is in
principle possible to extract algorithms from all the existence results
we establish."
[17], p. 233, 235; italics added.
4Although this laboratory is in a department of which I have been a fully ￿edged member
for a decade, I am still mysti￿ed by the appellation ￿ computable￿in the name of the laboratory.
To the best of my knowledge, no one who has anything to do with the running of the laboratory,
nor anyone of the graduate students who have done - or are doing - their doctorate under its
auspices have the slightest idea of what computable economics signi￿es. This is despite the
fact that both Stefano Zambelli and I have lectured, regularly, on Computable Economics,
at the Graduate School, to which CEEL is also attached - and despite the appearance of my
book ([29]), exactly ten years ago, the year I began my association with the department of
economics at the University of Trento.
5Orthodox economists, such as Spear and Durlauf, have made remarks along these lines
in articles or reviews published in so-called prestigious Journals (see, for e.g., [27]). Remarks
about constructive proofs, without a clear understanding of what such a thing means, are
particularly replete in game theory (see, for e.g., [16]). The ￿rst mistake is about the meaning
of the domain and range of relevance in algorithmic mathematics; the second is about the
nature of proof in one kind of algorithmic mathematics.
5Barkley Rosser6 questioned, perceptively, my stand on non-standard analysis
and had some incisive observations on the link between non-standard analysis
and constructive mathematics. Just to make my position on the role, indeed
the importance of non-standard analysis, in algorithmic economics clear, I shall
quote an early stance I took on this important issue. In [30], I pointed out
(footnote 1, p. 587):
Although it may appear paradoxical, I am of the opinion that
non-standard analysis should be placed squarely in the constructive
tradition - at least from the point of view of practice. Ever since
Leibniz chose a notation for the di⁄erential and integral calculus
that was conducive to computation, a notation that has survived
even in the quintessentially non-computational tradition of classi-
cal real analysis, the practice of non-standard analysis has remained
￿rmly rooted in applicability from a computational point of view.
Indeed, the ￿rst modern rejuvenation of the non-standard tradition
in the late 50s and early 60s, at the hands of Schmieden and Laug-
witz (cf. [22]), had constructive underpinnings. I add the caveat
￿ modern￿because Veronese￿ s sterling e⁄orts (cf.[35]) at the turn of
the 19th century did not succeed in revitalising the subject due to its
unfair dismissal by Peano and Russell, from di⁄erent points of view.
The former dismissed it, explicitly, for lacking in ￿ rigour￿ ; the latter,
implicitly, by claiming that the triple problems of the in￿nitesimal,
in￿nity and the continuum had been ￿ solved￿ .
However, I have not made - as yet - a sustained case for non-standard analytic
computable economics. The reason is that I have not been able to come to terms
with the full philosophical and epistemological force of the L￿wenheim-Skolem
theorem and the Skolem paradox7. Skolem gave two proofs of what is now called
the L￿wenheim-Skolem theorem, one in 1920, where he used the axiom of choice
and, later, in 1922, without the axiom of choice. He concluded the beautiful
1922 Lecture8 with an observation that is of particular relevance for the way I
believe algorithmic mathematical economics should be formalized. viz., without
any reliance or foundations in set theory (in particular, ZFC):
6I shall not try to distinguish between Rosser Snr., and Rosser Jnr., in any pedantic way,
in the main text!
7For the absolute novice, a loose statement of the L￿wenheim-Skolem theorem goes some-
thing like this: Every formal system expressed in the ￿rst order functional calculus has a de-
numerable model. The Skolem paradox, on the other hand, although not a ￿ genuine￿paradox
in the same sense of the other logical antinomies, is also philosophically and epistemologically
disturbing. Again, informally phrased, the Skolem paradox states that there is a ￿rst order
theory, such that if it has an intended model, it has both a countable and an uncountable
model. Hunter ([10], Part Three ), is a reasonably clear and accessible reference to a formal
approach to these important issues. Shapiro ([24]), on the other hand, has a clear, albeit
concise, discussion of the paradoxical implications of the theorem and the paradox. The rig-
orous versions of the theorem and the paradox, together with a characteristically illuminating
discussion, can be found in the Kleene ￿ classic￿ ([11], especially, pp. 425-7).
8Delivered to the Fifth Congress of Scandinavian Mathematicians, held in Helsinki, in
August, 1922.
6"....I believed that it was so clear that axiomatization in terms
of sets was not a satisfactory ultimate foundation of mathematics,
that mathematicians would, for the most part, not be very much
concerned with it. But in recent times I have seen to my surprise
that so many mathematicians think that these axioms of set theory
provide the ideal foundation for mathematics; therefore it seemed to
me that the time had come to publish a critique. "
[25], pp. 300-1; italics added.
It was not that Skolem was sceptical about the need for ￿and the possibility
of ￿foundations for mathematics; but he desired it to be ￿ recursive￿ , possibly
based on inductive de￿nitions - he did not think the foundations could be found,
or should be sought, in axiomatic set theory. Orthodox mathematical economics
￿even when using non-standard analysis ￿seems to pride itself in the fact that
the mathematics it uses is founded on ZFC.
I have not had time to sort these issues in a clear and simple way, so far, but
hope to come to a view in the near future. Till, then, I have con￿ned myself
to using non-standard analysis in bridging the gap between the use of ad hoc
discontinuities in standard nonlinear dynamics and rigorous continuity in non-
standard analysis, using in￿nitesimals imaginatively, even on digital computers.
Related to this is my particular personal satisfaction to note that the non-
standard proof of Peanos￿existence theorem for ODE￿ s avoids the use of the
Ascoli lemma. In the main paper, published in this Issue, I mentioned the non-
constructive nature of the Ascoli lemma and its suspicious use in the standard
proof of Peano￿ s existence theorem for ODEs (see, the last paragraph just before
the beginning of § 3.1)9.
I would like to take this opportunity to add a very ￿ personal note￿on the
way I came to become familiar with non-standard analysis, particularly because
mathematical economists seem to think the revival of the noble tradition of in-
￿nitesimals owes everything to Abraham Robinson￿ s undoubted contributions.
Moreover, very few mathematical economists can even imagine that the in￿n-
itesimals of non-standard analysis make it possible to dispel with the ad-hoc
discontinuities even in so-called rigorous non-linear dynamics, via relaxation
oscillations (see [34] on the non-standard analysis of the existence (sic!) of mul-
tiple limit cycles in the van der Pol equation, ubiquitous in endogenous business
cycle theories).
Economists routinely reason in terms of in￿nitesimals, without, of course,
realizing it. Every time mathematical economists cavalierly invoke ￿ price taking￿
behaviour due to the insigni￿cance of individual agents in a perfectly compet-
itive market, they are invoking poor old Archimedes, too. My own realization
of his immanent presence in the mathematics I was using came about entirely
accidentally, but felicitously.
A completely accidental ￿nd, at a Cambridge antiquarian bookshop, of Max
Newman￿ s copy of Hobson￿ s classic text on real analysis, [8], during what turned
9The elegant exposition of the non-standard proof is given on pp. 30-1, Theorem 1.5.1, in
[1].
7out, subsequently, to be a melancholy visit to that city in late 1977, was the
beginning of my initiation into non-Archimedean mathematics. It so happened
that I was spending that academic year as a Research Fellow at C.O.R.E, in
Louvain-La-Neuve and my neighbouring o¢ ce was occupied by Robert Aumann.
I found Hobson￿ s book eminently readable ￿all 770 pages of it, in that ￿rst edi-
tion format I was reading; it later expanded into double that size in later edi-
tions. However I was perplexed by the fact, clearly pointed out in the book, that
Hobson referred to Giuseppe Veronese as the modern ￿ resurrector￿of the older
Leibniz-Newton notion of in￿nitesimals and his ￿Veronese￿ s ￿development of a
calculus devoid of the Archimedean assumption, ([8], pp.54-6). The perplexity
was, of course, that none of the historical allusions to the founding fathers of
nonstandard analysis even remotely referred to Veronese as one of them. There
were the great originators: Leibniz and Newton; then there was the great res-
urrection by Skolem; and, ￿nally, the ￿ quantum￿jump to Abraham Robinson.
Neither Peirce, nor Veronese, both of whom explicitly and cogently denied the
Archimedean axiom in their development of analysis, were ever referred to, at
least in the ￿ standard￿texts on nonstandard analysis.
Aumann, who had done much to make continuum analysis of price taking
behaviour rigorous in mathematical economics was my neighbour. One morning
I dropped by at his o¢ ce and showed him the pages in Hobson￿ s book, referring
to Veronese￿ s nonstandard analysis, and asked him whether it was not a proper
precursor to Abraham Robinson￿ s work and a clear successor to Leibniz and
Newton, at least with respect to in￿nitesimals and the (non-) Archimedean
axioms? He promised to read it carefully, borrowed my book, and disappeared,
as he usually did, on a Friday. He returned on the following Monday, gave me
back my copy of Hobson with a cryptic, but unambiguous, remark: ￿ Yes, indeed,
this work by Veronese appears to be a precursor to Abraham Robinson￿ .
Why had Veronese￿ s modern classic, [35], ￿ disappeared￿from orthodox his-
tories of nonstandard analysis, at least at that time? Some rummaging through
the historical status of Veronese￿ s work on non-Archimedean analysis, particu-
larly in Italy, gave me a clue as to what had happened. It was Veronese￿ s mis-
fortune to have published his work on nonstandard analysis just as his slightly
younger great Italian mathematical contemporary, Giuseppe Peano, was begin-
ning his successful crusade to consolidate the movement to make standard real
analysis rigorous. Veronese￿ s book was severely criticised10 for falling foul of
the emerging orthodox standards of ￿ rigour￿and fell o⁄ the backs of the o¢ cial
mathematical community like water o⁄ of a duck￿ s back. If only they knew
what nonstandard ducks would eventually be shown to be capable of, just in
the study of the van der Pol equation alone(see [34]!
10See, in particular, Peano￿ s ￿ open letter￿to Veronese, [18], in the very ￿rst volume of the
Journal Peano founded in 1891, Rivista di Matematica. The hands of fate have a way of
making con￿uences toll heavily in one direction than another! I may add that my interest,
as a Trento economist, has a regional patriotic ￿avour in favour of Veronese. He was from
Chioggia, ￿ here￿in the Northeast of Italy; Peano was from, Spinetta, near Cuneo, at the other
end of the horizontal divide of Italy, the Northwest!
83 Computably Approximating Discontinuities
"Algorithms are becoming worthy of analysis in their own right,
not merely as a means to solve other problems. This I am suggesting
that as the study of an equation (e.g., manifold) played such an
important role in 20th-century mathematics, the study of ￿nding
the solutions (e.g., an algorithm) may play an equally important
role in the next century."
[26], p.8; italics added.
Duncan Foley￿ s concise, but characteristically focused contribution centres
on the importance of the notion of, and the theory of, approximations, and
its almost complete neglect in orthodox economic theory. I believe I have, in
my contribution (but see also [32]) ￿ perhaps more between the lines than
explicitly ￿ underlined the importance of a rigorous theory of approximations
in every kind of algorithmic theory, but very particularly so in computable and
constructive analysis.
Here, I would like to take the opportunity to clarify a vague, and apparently
￿ throwaway￿remark, and use it to develop a theme about the computability
of ￿ discontinuous￿equations, thus continuing (sic!) a theme broached in the
previous section.
I stated, in footnote 17, of the main paper in this Issue, as follows:
"The generalization of the function concept, inspired by the needs
of theoretical physics as envisaged by a supremely intuitively rigor-
ous theoretical physicist, that resulted in ￿ Distributions￿ , had the
important ￿ computational￿purpose of being able to work with func-
tions that were always di⁄erentiable. After the Weierstrassian ￿ mon-
strosities￿had been discovered, ￿rst by Takagi, in 1903, in an explicit
example, (cf. [28]), of functions that were ￿ continuous everywhere
but di⁄erentiable nowhere￿ , there was a hiatus waiting to be ￿lled:
a hiatus that could have been ￿lled either by re-interpreting the no-
tion of function or generalizing it. The latter path resulted - but
not because it was an exercise in ￿ gratuitous generalization￿([23],
p. 211); but because it was motivated by the needs of a theoretical
problem solver."
Any careful reader would have found the incongruence between ￿ after￿and
￿ ￿rst￿ in the phrase ￿ After the Weierstrassian monstrosities were discovered,
￿rst by Takagi, in 1903, ....￿! A comprehensive ￿ story￿of the early saga of these
￿ monstrosities￿can be found in [9], especially §271, pp. 401-4. What I meant
to say was that Takagi￿ s example was constructed about thirty years before
the more famous, pedagogically popular, example of Van der Waerden11. My
reference to the Takagi example had an ￿ ulterior￿motive, but I was not able to
11I myself learned the analytical details of the ￿ existence of everywhere-continuous, nowhere
di⁄erentiable functions￿from Landau￿ s classic, elementary textbook on ￿ Di⁄erential and Inte-
gral Calculus￿([12], Theorem 100, p. 73). Landau, ironical as ever, stated in the ￿ Preface To
9develop it further at the time I wrote [31], simply because I was not technically
equipped to do it. Work I have done since then, in particular to try to give
a computable solution and interpretation to the ￿ Finance Function￿in [4] (pp.
451-2 & Figure 2), built up from a ￿ saw-tooth￿like time-paths of the inventories
of the relevant variables, all of which had been assumed to be integers or rational
numbers.
In essence I was looking for a way to understand the computability of a
discontinuous function that was built up from a mapping of rational variables
to rational variables. Till about one year ago, I felt the only way to handle such
formulations was to view them as Diophantine equations and, then, appeal to
results on the negative solution to Hilbert￿ s Tenth Problem.
I knew that the Takagi function can be shown to map rationals to rationals;
I was also aware - as many have been, for years - that the Takagi function is
an example of a ￿ Weierstrassian monstrosity￿￿i.e., it is provably a continuous-










8k;rk (t) = (￿1)b2
ktc is the kth Rademacher function12.
The Rademacher function, in turn is a kind of sequence of step functions, the
kind that appears in the remarkable Clower-Howitt analysis of the Transactions
Theory of the Demand for Money. Now, the Takagi function maps rationals to
rationals, viz:
Theorem 1 If x 2 Q;then ￿ (x) 2 Q
I had to understand how to interpret computability of the discontinuous,
step-like, Rademacher function, so that I could ￿nd a way to apply it to the
Clower-Howitt ￿ Finance Function￿- and, thereby, crack the eternal nut of ratio-
nal valued economic mappings, avoiding the conundrums of Diophantine Deci-
sion problems. It was at this point, a few months ago, I discovered the remark-
able work of what I shall call, for want of a better name, the ￿ Yasugi school￿at
Kyoto Sangyo University (cf., for e.g., [36]). They had applied the framework
The (First) German Edition￿ , (op.cit, p.2):
Some mathematicians may think it unorthodox to give as the second theorem
after the de￿nition of the derivative, Weierstrass￿theorem on the existence of
functions which are continuous everywhere but di⁄erentiable nowhere. To them I
would say that while there are very good mathematicians who have never learned
any proof of that theorem, it can do the beginner no harm to learn the simplest
proof to date right from his textbook, and it may serve as a useful illustration
which will enhance his understanding of the concept of derivative.
12An excellent introduction to Rademacher functions can be found in [5], §8.6.
10that had been developed by Pour-El & Richards ([19]) to interpret the com-
putability of discontinuous functions, embedded in a Banach Space. It is here
that approximation enters digital computation quite precisely and allows one to
de￿ne the computability of discontinuous functions. The main idea is to con-
sider a function ￿even, indeed, especially, discontinuous ones ￿as computable
if they can be e⁄ectively approximated by a computable sequence of continuous
functions, with respect to the norm of the space.
In a series of serendipities, I am now able to complete one key aspect of the
research program in Algorithmic Mathematical Economics. This is the need to
constrain economic variables to the domain and range of rational numbers, while
making it possible to interpret economically plausible mappings computably.
When I chose to mention the Takagi function, instead of referring to the more
￿ popular￿Van der Waerden example, as a repository of Weierstrassian mon-
strosities, my hunch was that it was going to provide the key links between,
approximations, discontinuities ￿displayed by step-like functions ￿their possi-
ble computabilities, due to the place occupied by the Rademacher functions in
the de￿nition of the Takagi function and the desirable property of ￿ (x) mapping
rationals to rationals.
In constructive mathematics, particularly of the Brouwerian variety, all con-
stituent functions are, ab initio, continuous. But this is not so in computable
analysis. It is this ￿ wedge￿that seemed impossible to crack and, therefore, I chose
refuge in the indeterminacies of Diophantine Decision Problems. By means of a
deft use of, and exploiting the power of, rigorous approximation theory in e⁄ec-
tive contexts, Algorithmic Mathematical Economics gains an enormous richness.
4 Whither Mathematical Economics
"Mathematical methods are more fashionable than ever before.
Witness the surge of interest in mathematical logic, mathematical bi-
ology, mathematical economics, mathematical psychology ￿in math-
ematical investigations of every sort. The extent to which many
of these investigations are premature or unrealistic indicates the
deep attraction mathematical exactitude holds for the contempo-
rary mind."
[2], p. vii; italics added.
I have not discussed the issue of ￿ proof￿and the validity or relevance of
various methods of ￿ proof￿in orthodox mathematical economics. I wish to take
a categorical stance on this aspect, as far as the methodology of Mathematical
Economics in the Algorithmic Mode is concerned. These are issues dealt with in
the penetrating, but concise, contributions by Dr Stephen Kinsella and Professor
Cassey Lee, both implicitly and explicitly.
Stefano Zambelli has observed, correctly and with much generosity, the path
from my reliance on recursion theory to one, more recently, where my inclina-
tions are more towards constructive mathematics, to de￿ne and characterise
11conputable economics. I am not sure my reasons are technical. I think one
of the reasons for this subtle shift, taken over a period of several years, has
been an increasing awareness that the Church-Turing Thesis is unnecessary as
a starting point for algorithmic mathematics. A second, and more important
reason, may well be more speci￿cally epistemological. I have come to realise the
importance of Brouwer￿ s Choice Sequences and his intuitive concept of the Ideal
Mathematician; this, coupled to a Husserlian phenomenological vision, feels a
more comfortable as an epistemological position for an economist who wants to
dethrone the kind of teleology that is pervasive in economic theory, especially
in its mathematical mode.
Moreover, I have come to believe that economists have no business proving
anything in any way except by means of methods sanctioned by Brouwerian
constructivists, underpinned by intuitionism. At the height of the Brouwer-
Hilbert controversies, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, there were attempts by
Hilbertian proof theorists to show that:
Is it possible to prove that all proofs of existence claims, with
the exception of those obtained by means of the axiom of choice,
can be shown to rely on an implicit exhibition of an instance. ...
A proof of the conjecture would have implied that most of classical
mathematics ￿the only exception being those parts relying on the
axiom of choice ￿is already ￿ constructive￿ .
[13], p.350
Of course, the conjecture was never ￿ proved￿ . If this hopeless e⁄ort is not
enough evidence to dissuade orthodox mathematical economists from continu-
ing their theological proof activities, then I don￿ t know what will be persuasive.
￿ Classical mathematics￿tries, in vain, to become ￿ constructive mathematics￿ .
The orthodox mathematical economist continues, with princely unconcern for
the meaning and relevance of methods of proof, using mysterious methods of
demonstrating the existence of algorithmically unde￿nable, uncomputable, en-
tities. These entities are, then, harnessed for use in momentous policy debates,
as if they have a material existence, and not just a phantom appearance in the
minds of orthodox mathematical economists.
Even more importantly ￿as I have now come to think and believe ￿mathe-
matical economists, as part of their routine graduate training should, therefore,
be taught, not only technique but also the meaning and relevance of valid meth-
ods of proof. How many orthodox mathematical economists have ever been
taught that the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is underpinned by undecidable
disjunctions and, hence, any theorem depending on it cannot be algorithmized.
If they were taught this fact, would they have any reason to be fascinated by
equilibrium existence proofs? Eschewing reductio ad absurdum, the law of dou-
ble negation or the tertium non datur is not a matter of aesthetic sensibilities
￿although that aspect, too, is important; but it is a serious question of practi-
cal relevance, when used indiscriminately to derive momentous policy-pregnant
propositions.
12I shall end my ￿ re￿ ections￿by making an almost propaganda-like case for
mathematical economics in the algorithmic mode.
An advanced text book on Di⁄usions, Markov Processes and Martingales
([21], p.1), de￿nes, on the ￿rst page, Brownian motion:
De￿nition 2 A real-valued stochastic process fBt : t 2 R+g is a Brownian mo-
tion if it as the properties
1. B0 (!) = 0;8!;
2. the map t 7! Bt (w) is a continuous function of t 2 R+ for all !;
3. for every t;h > 0;Bt+h ￿ Bt is independent of fBu : 0 6 u 6 tg; and has
a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance h:
The authors, then, go on to ask, and give four answers to the question, ￿ Why
study it?￿(ibid, p.1):
"(i) Virtually every interesting class of processes contains Brown-
ian motion ￿Brownian motion is a martingale, a Gaussian process,
a Markov process, a di⁄usion, a LØvy process, ....;
(ii) Brownian motion is su¢ ciently concrete that one can do ex-
plicit calculations, which are impossible for more general objects;
(iii) Brownian motion can be used as a building block for other
processes Indeed, a number of the most important results on Brown-
ian motion state that the most general process in a certain class can
be obtained from Brownian motion by some sequence of transforma-
tions);
(iv) last, but not least, Brownian motion is a rich and beautiful
mathematical object in its own right."
Suppose I now de￿ned a Turing Machine and made the same four claims and
ask an economist to choose between the two formulations?13 Which of the two
formulations should the economist choose, for modelling economic processes?
What kind of considerations should the economist take into account before de-
ciding for one or the other of the two formulations to model economic phenom-
ena? I would urge the economist, in his or her deliberation phase to remember
the nature of the domain and range over which economic variables can, at best,
be de￿ned. I would also urge the economist to keep in mind the results of
the previous section on the Takagi function, which, like Brownian motion, is a
Weierstrassian monster - i.e., continuous-everywhere, di⁄erentiable nowhere. I
would also plead with the economist to read carefully the considered opinion
of an outstanding applied mathematician, who was also one of the pioneers of
mathematical ￿nance theory, Maury Osborne ([15]):
13To be quite rigorous and complete, I should add the usual formal de￿nition of a formal
dynamical system (cf.,[3] or [7], pp.159-160) and consider the ￿ coupled￿system of the Turing
Machine and the formal dynamical system. Such a coupled system can satisfy the four claims
as easily, if not also capable of displaying itself as a more ￿ beautiful mathematical object in
its own right￿ .
13As for the question of replacing rows of closely spaced dots by
solid lines, you can do that too if you want to, and the governors of
the exchange and the community of brokers and dealers who make
markets will bless you. If you think in terms of solid lines while
the practice is in terms of dots and little steps up and down, this
misbelief on your part is worth, I would say conservatively, to the
governors of the exchange, at least eighty million dollars per year."
[15], p.34; italics added.
In other words, Osborne emphasizes, in a whimsical way, the fact that eco-
nomic and ￿nancial data can only be graphed as step-functions. What of conti-
nuity, then? What are the domains and ranges of typical economic and ￿nancial
variables?
Even more interestingly, another renowned applied mathematician, who was
also a pioneer information theorist, made some observations that almost sum-
marise my discussions. I shall, therefore, quote extensively, to complete this
￿ manifesto￿ , invoking Richard Hamming￿ s powerful summary:
"Thus without further examination it is not completely evident
that the classical real number system will prove to be appropriate to
the needs of probability. Perhaps the real number system is: (1) not
rich enough - see non-standard analysis; (2) just what we want - see
standard mathematics; or (3) more than is needed - see constructive
mathematics, and computable numbers. ...
What are all these uncountably many non-computable numbers
that the conventional real number system includes?....
The intuitionists, of whom you seldom hear about in the process
of getting a classical mathematical education, have long been articu-
late about the troubles that arise in the standard mathematics, have
long been articulate about the troubles that arise in the standard
mathematics, including the paradoxes, in the usual foundations of
mathematics. One such is the Skolem-L￿wenheim paradox which
asserts that any ￿nite number of postulates has a realization that
is countable. This means that no ￿nite number of postulates can
uniquely characterise the accepted real number system. .... Again,
the Banach-Tarski paradox, ... suggests that we must be wary of
using such kinds of mathematics in many real world applications in-
cluding probability theory. These statements warn us that we should
not use the classical real number system without carefully thinking
whether or not it is appropriate for new applications to probability.
....
What are we to think of this situation? What is the role in prob-
ability theory for these numbers which can never occur in practice?"
[6], pp. 90-1; italics added.
How could the economist not opt for the algorithmic alternative?
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